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ABSTRACT
Unnoticed by most people, Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) control entire productions and critical
infrastructures such as water distribution, smart grid and automotive manufacturing. Due to the
ongoing digitalization, these systems are becoming more and more connected in order to enable
remote control and monitoring. However, this shift bears significant risks, namely a larger attack
surface, which can be exploited by attackers. In order to make these systems more secure, it takes
research, which is, however, difficult to conduct on productive systems, since these often have to
operate twenty-four-seven. Testbeds are mostly very expensive or based on simulation with no
real-world physical process. In this paper, we introduce LICSTER, an open-source low-cost ICS
testbed, which enables researchers and students to get hands-on experience with industrial security
for about 500 Euro. We provide all necessary material to quickly start ICS hacking, with the focus
on low-cost and open-source for education and research.
Keywords Industrial Internet of Things, Testbed, Open-source, Low-cost, Security, Education, Research
©Efficient Passive ICS Device Discovery and Identification by MAC Address Correlation – First published in the Electronic
Workshops in Computing series at 6th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2019 (ICS-CSR
2019) DOI: 10.14236/ewic/icscsr19.1
1 Introduction
New concepts brought by industry 4.0 start to drastically change the requirements for industrial plants. Predictive
maintenance for example, a concept where machines get serviced before they fail based on collected usage data,
demand for a high amount of data sources and pervasive communications. Industrial Control System (ICS) devices
such as Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems gather the
data within these environments, e.g. from sensors and actors. Nowadays, most ICS devices communicate via TCP/IP
protocols with each other. The rise in connected devices inherently increases the attack surface of a network and thus
the systems within it. To keep the evermore complex ICSs secure, it takes trained and well educated personnel as well
as substantial research in this area. However, it is risky to conduct research and training on productive plants, as minor
disturbances can quickly lead to costly incidents. Due to this reason, testbeds for research and education are essential.
In principle, there are three types of testbeds: Virtualized, real-world and hybrid approaches. Just as there are different
types, there are different tasks for which a testbed can be used. For security scenarios and attacks on an ICS in
particular, a real-world testbed incorporating a physical process is preferred to wholly understanding the effects and
attack vectors in a production environment. Unfortunately, purchasing real industrial hardware for a testbed is very
expensive and particularly for education and research often not affordable. Additionally, the proprietary devices
prevent pervasive changes, which makes research partly difficult.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
00
30
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 O
ct 
20
19
LICSTER – A Low-cost ICS Security Testbed for Education and Research A PREPRINT
In this paper, we present LICSTER, an open-source, low-cost ICS testbed with the following contributions:
• Testbed components for about 500 Euro, which is affordable by most researchers and students.
• A real-world physical process controlled by an ICS, which enables to demonstrate and analyze the impacts
of cyber attacks in the real-world.
• The feasibility of the testbed is shown and ideas for research are discussed.
• The components are open-source and open-hardware, as far as possible. This allows a wide range of further
research.
• We provide attacker models and attacks to understand threat scenarios in industrial environments.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the concept of LICSTER is presented. Section 3 describes the
proposed implementation of the components. The paper continuous with an evaluation in Section 4, with a discussion
about further training and research questions. Eventually, Section 5 concludes this work.
2 ICS Testbed
Setting up a testbed is mostly not the final goal, but simply a tool to achieve a bigger objective. That makes it crucial
to have a clear understanding of that objective and its constraints before beginning to design a testbed. Especially for
an ICS security testbed for education and research, having clear attacker models and a prepared list of attack scenarios
is valuable.
2.1 ICS Basics
The International Electrotechnical Commission and others (2003) introduced a standard structure of ICSs in the IEC
62264, as illustrated in Figure 1.
ERP
MES
SCADA
PLC
Sensors, Actuators, etc.
Assembly-/Manufacturing
Process
Level 1
Control level
Level 2
Process control level
Level 3
Plant level
Level 4
Corporate level
Level 1
Field level
Level 0
Process level
Figure 1: IEC 62264 Industrial Automation Pyramid
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) stands for the entrepreneurial task of planning and controlling resources such
as capital, personnel, operating resources and materials in a timely and appropriate manner. A Manufacturing Execu-
tion System (MES) refers to a process-related level of a multi-layered manufacturing management system. SCADA
defines a system for monitoring and controlling of technical processes by a computer system. A HMI resides on
level one of the Industrial Automation Pyramid and allows an operator to interact with a machine or plant. A
Historian is a computer on level two, where conditions, input and output information is stored for long term analysis.
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a device that is used to control a machine or plant and that is digitally
programmed. Remote input/output (IO) devices read inputs and write outputs over a field-bus or network connection.
2.2 Testbed Requirements
As Green et al. (2017) concluded, a testbed, sophisticated and versatile as it may be, has little use unless it is broadly
accessible. Additionally, many scenarios should be able to be covered with LICSTER, resulting in the following
requirements:
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• In order to make the testbed affordable for teaching and research, it must be designed for low-cost.
• A physical process must be represented to study consequences of cyber attacks on ICSs.
• In order to obtain repeatable results, the entire process must be reproducible.
• The testbed must be portable, e.g. for teaching and demonstration to gain awareness. Furthermore, a small
footprint is easier to handle, e.g. when modifying components.
• By using open-source software and hardware, research on components is feasible.
• The testbed implementation should cover level 0 to level 2 of a common ICS, focusing on the physical process
and SCADA environment.
2.3 Related Work
Due to the ongoing interests in ICS security a lot of testbeds were created around the world in the past years. Holm
et al. (2015) described and compared 30 testbeds in a survey. However, the testbeds listed there are either, expensive,
closed-source or virtualized. LICSTER clearly distances itself from those testbeds with its clear focus on open-source
and low-cost components.
Testbeds for ICS are expensive, especially when they are built with standard hardware, for example the testbed used
in Niedermaier et al. (2018) is about 35 000 Euro. This testbed fulfill the task of specific robustness tests of ICS
components. However, the size and cost makes it unattractive for most researchers and students.
Queiroz et al. (2009) describe a modular testbed based on Modbus/TCP. However, they only show simple Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks and make changes difficult because of proprietary hardware.
Green et al. (2017) describe ten lessons learned by setting-up an ICS testbed. They built up a huge testbed, but also
concluded that local access and e.g. a mobile demo unit are essential.
McLaughlin et al. (2016) summarize the ICS landscape and also describe the requirement of testbeds. They high-
light the need for real-world physical consequences and their monitoring. LICSTER matches these requirements and
additionally enables monitoring the physical process.
Maynard et al. (2018) and also Formby et al. (2018) introduced an open framework for SCADA virtualization and
simulation. However, a pure simulation or virtualization does not fulfill our requirements. Nevertheless, this could be
taken into consideration as an expansion.
Foley et al. (2018) use a Fischertechnik simulation model for cyber security science hackathons. The basic idea is
similar, but they are proprietary components and the testbed is significantly more expensive.
2.4 Attacker Modeling
There is no single defense mechanism to mitigate all threats to a digital system. Depending on the nature and origin
of an attacker, some defenses might be less useful than others. Therefore, before defining the possible attack scenarios
against LICSTER, the potential attackers must be defined.
The remote attacker has network access to the ICS through a router. That means that the attacker can reach the
system only via its Internet Protocol (IP) address and thus preventing attacks below the OSI network layer three (Day
& Zimmermann (1983)). This replicates the scenario of exposed control systems (Durumeric et al. (2015)), as for
example, when devices are connected to the Internet for e.g. maintenance reasons.
In contrast to the capabilities of the remote attacker, the local attacker has direct access to the ICS. Being present at
the plant site allows on the one hand the possibility for physical attacks on the individual ICS components. On the
other hand, the direct access to the network switch where ICS components are connected to. This enables an attacker
to perform Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing and all the attacks that rely on it.
2.5 Attack Scenarios
A central distinction between traditional office networks and production networks is, that ICS networks has to manage
the transition to physical processes. That makes it all the more important for a relevant ICS testbed to incorporate
a physical process, as it allows attacks on the system from an entirely different perspective. With LICSTER various
attack scenarios on the ICS levels zero to two are possible.
The act of network sniffing can be separated into two methods. The first is a passive approach. An attacker can utilize
a mirror port or network tap to capture the traffic or simply receive and read broadcast messages. The second method
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of network sniffing is an active technique, where traffic is redirected over the host of the attacker by manipulation on
the Media Access Control (MAC) layer through e.g. ARP poisoning.
More uncomplicated is the DoS attack, where the target is flooded by network packages it needs to react to. Is the
amount of requests high enough, the accumulated network and/or Central Processing Unit (CPU) load of reacting to
each and every package eventually causes the regular execution of the target to slow down or stop completely.
With a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack, an intruder manages to place himself between two communication partners
through manipulation of routing information on the IP layer or MAC layer. There the attacker is able to capture and/or
manipulate the exchanged packages.
Additionally, a manipulation over the network of ICS components is possible, as e.g. shown by Niedermaier et al.
(2017) where the network interface of a PLC is fuzzed to manipulated the PLC.
Apart from network based attack vectors, a culprit with physical access has a wide range of attacks at his disposal
such as manipulating devices, e.g. sensors, plug- and unplugging systems and straightforward destroying components
of the ICS. Following comes a certainly not comprehensive list of possible attacks mapped to the ICS levels:
Layer 2 Layer 1 Layer 0
Remote
IO 2
Remote
IO 1
PLC
HMI
SCADA,
historian, ...
Physical
process
User
interaction
Modbus/TCP
Modbus/TCPModbus/TCP
Modbus/TCP
touch/web
web
electrical
electrical
Figure 2: System view of LICSTER.
Attacks on level 0 (process level):
• Manipulating the physical process for example by removing the commodity
• Physically damage machines so that the process is not performed properly, e.g. with raw violence
Attacks on level 1 (field level):
• DoS attack on e.g. sensors or actuators
• Interfering with availability by disconnecting the network or power plug
• Manipulating a sensor physically so it transmits spoofed values
• MitM to manipulate the values between the PLC and remote IO
Attacks on level 1 (control level):
• DoS attack on the PLC or HMI
• Sniffing network traffic, e.g. to get sensitive production information
• MitM to manipulate the values of the PLC or HMI
• Physical access to the HMI, e.g. to stop the process
Attacks on level 2 (process control level):
• DoS attack on the SCADA and historian systems
• Sniffing network traffic, e.g. to get sensitive process details
• MitM to manipulating the values of the SCADA or historian server
• Manipulating the state of the SCADA system, e.g. to reduce the daily order count
Attacks in the various ICS levels require different access rights and tools, which are described in detail in Section 4 of
the evaluation of LICSTER.
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3 Testbed Implementation
The testbed presented in this paper handles the physical, field, control and supervisory level of the Industrial
Automation Pyramid as described in Figure 2. The implementation of the testbed is designed in a way to allow for
industry 4.0 scenarios as well as the more traditional ICS cases. That means that the entire communication between the
PLC, the HMI and even the remote IOs is based on TCP/IP protocols, namely Modbus/TCP. The sensors themselves
communicate with the remote IOs on a fieldbus protocol, for which Modbus/TCP was chosen which is broadly used
in the industry. An overview of the devices in the testbed is given in Table 1 and described in detail in the upcoming
sections (Section 3.2 to Section 3.4). The total amount of 577.– Euro is not necessarily the cheapest choice, because it
depends on the prices of the distributor.
Table 1: Overview of devices used in our testbed. Prices are current prices on amazon.de
Component Software Hardware IP Price ca.
Remote IO FreeRTOS, LwIP Custom, STM32F7 192.168.0.51/52 79.-- Euro
PLC OpenPLCv3 Raspberry Pi 3 192.168.0.30 56.-- Euro
SCADA ScadaLTS, Logging Raspberry Pi 192.168.0.20 56.-- Euro
HMI Custom, PyModbus Raspberry Pi with Display 192.168.0.10 139.-- Euro
Switch - TP-Link 192.168.0.1 32.-- Euro
Process - Fischertechnik - 195.-- Euro
Others - e.g. cables - 20.-- Euro
Total 577.-- Euro
Figure 3 shows the testbed mounted on a wooden board for portability. The HMI, the two remote IOs and the physical
process are placed on top. The network switch and two Raspberry Pis are fixed on the bottom side of the board.
HMI
Remote IOs Process
Figure 3: Top view on LICSTER.
3.1 PLC
As PLC the open-source solution OpenPLC from Alves et al. (2014) is used. It is a soft PLC, which means that it can
be run on various operating systems and on hardware with and also without IOs. Within LICSTER OpenPLC runs on
a Raspberry Pi, with our PLC procedure programmed in Structured Text (ST) which is uploaded to the PLC over its
own web portal.
The program contains a simple, repeatable process which can be triggered and monitored by the HMI as shown in
Figure 4. The process consists of five stages in which it moves and processes a plastic cylinder as an workpiece
example.
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Initialize
(1)start
Goods to
punching
machine
(2)
Punching
machine
down
(3)
Punching
machine
up
(4)
Goods to
origin
position
(5)
Error state
(6)
reset
e
e
e
e
Figure 4: Program sequence of the process implemented on the PLC.
1 Before starting, the initial conditions must be fulfilled with everything at rest and the cylinder at its place. 2 The
conveyor belt moves the plastic cylinder to the punching machine and stops right underneath it. 3 The punching
machine moves downwards until its lower limit switch is triggered, 4 then continues to move up again until its upper
limit switch is triggered. 5 Finally, the conveyor belt moves the plastic cylinder away from the punching machine,
back to its origin and then stops. 6 If an detectable error (e) occurs or the emergency stop is pressed, the machine
goes in an error state, by stopping every movement. This can be reset on the HMI.
3.2 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
The HMI is provided by a webserver which runs on a dedicated Raspberry Pi attached to a touch-screen. The web
application is split into three areas – view, order and control – where the user has the possibility to monitor the process,
place orders and thus trigger the described process, and to manually control the conveyor belt and the punching
machine via the touch panel. This behaviour resembles a real HMI. Figure 5 shows a screenshot of the HMI, where
the process is observed. Through this functionality and usage, authentic attack scenarios can be set up. To base
the HMI on a webserver has several perks: Firstly, it reflects the change of technology introduced by industry 4.0.
Companies like Siemens are already pursuing this approach with their WinCC/Web Navigator1. Secondly, knowledge
about web-technologies is wide-spread and conveniently accessible, making this HMI easy to understand, extend
and exploit. And thirdly, with small modifications, such as introducing Wi-Fi to the Raspberry Pi, the HMI can be
effortlessly ported to tablets or smartphones, which introduces new attack vectors and, again, represents the shift to
contemporary technologies.
Figure 5: Picture showing the HMI.
Additionally to monitoring the process, orders can be placed and the controller can be set in a manual mode, where
the process is controlled by the operator. This also brings the human component into play in the testbed.
1https://w3.siemens.com/mcms/human-machine-interface/en/visualization-software/scada/
wincc-options/wincc-web-navigator/Pages/Default.aspx
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3.3 Remote IO
The remote IOs are self-developed, open-source solutions based on a development board from STMicroelectronics.
The base board is a STM32F767ZI2 with an Arduino Uno V3 header, where our custom add-on board is connected
to. Using the Arduino Uno V3 header for the custom Printed Circuit Board (PCB) allows the underlying prototyping
board to be changed easily with other compatible boards. This is relevant, for example, if higher performance, an
energy-saving solution or cheaper hardware is needed.
Transistors LEDs Network
DisplayIOs Custom PCB
STM32 development boardUSB
Figure 6: PCB of the remote IOs.
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector for programming and power is placed on the left side of the development
board. The RJ45 Ethernet connector for networking is mounted on the right side. The custom PCB is mainly necessary
to convert the 24V of the physical process to the 3.3V of the STM32 development board. Additionally, each remote IO
is connected to a display as illustrated in Figure 7. There the operator can monitor the current state of the Modbus/TCP
inputs registers and coils.
Figure 7: Picture showing the display mounted on each remote IO.
Applying displays to field level components is a trend that can also be seen by real-world components. In larger plants
and systems, it simplifies identifying erroneous devices for the operator. What is more, these devices often allow a
simple on-site basic configuration during commissioning.
3.4 Physical Process (Fischertechnik)
One of the main requirements is to use a real physical process so that impacts are directly visible. However, in
order to keep the necessary skills low, an affordable as well as manageable solution is used in our testbed. Another
requirement to the process is, that it should be automatically repeatable without the need for human interaction. That
way the researcher or student has enough time to execute his attacks and to observe the effects. The selected device is
a Fischertechnik punching machine 96785 sim3, as shown in Figure 8 which costs 195 Euro.
2https://www.st.com/en/evaluation-tools/nucleo-f767zi.html
3https://www.fischertechnik.de/en/products/simulating/training-models/96785-sim-punching-machine-with-conveyor-belt-24v-simulation
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Goods
Light barrier
Driver board Conveyor belt
Punching machine
Limit switch
Figure 8: Picture showing the Fischertechnik setup.
The Fischertechnik system consists out of a conveyor belt, two light-barrier, two limit-switches and two motors. The
light-barriers are placed at each end of the conveyor belt and the limit-switches control the upper and lower limit of the
punching machine. One electric motor drives the conveyor belt clockwise and counterclockwise and the other electric
motor lifts and lowers the punching machine from and to the conveyor belt.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of outgoing network packets per s.
10−2
10−1
100
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IP: 192.168.0.10 (SCADA)
IP: 192.168.0.20 (HMI)
IP: 192.168.0.30 (PLC)
IP: 192.168.0.51 (Re. IO1)
IP: 192.168.0.52 (Re. IO2)
Figure 9: Density plot showing the number of packets per second of each device within LICSTER.
3.5 SCADA/Historian
The software used as SCADA system for our testbed is Scada-LTS4. It is an open-source solution which supports
Modbus/TCP and is entirely web-based. It also represents the shift to contemporary technologies in industry 4.0. The
software runs on a Raspberry Pi. Its webpage can be accessed by any system within the network.
3.6 Necessary Skills
Although the testbed is designed to keep the entry hurdle for new students as low as possible, basic knowledge about
the following three aspects is necessary. 1 Basic electric knowledge is required to safely connect a few wires to
4https://github.com/SCADA-LTS/Scada-LTS
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the system. However, this is very limited, since only four sensors and two motors must be connected. 2 When the
STM32-based remote IOs should be used, soldering skills and a soldering iron are necessary. This can be avoided by
e.g. using Raspberry Pis with 24V IOs as recommended by the OpenPLC project, but this results in a smaller testbed
and also a more expensive price. 3 Basic Linux skills are of benefit to set-up the Raspberry Pis and use the attacking
tools. However, we provide necessary material and guides to setup the testbed, which reduce the initial hurdles to a
minimum.
4 Evaluation and Benchmarking of the Testbed
The evaluation of our testbed consists of three tiers. At first it is assured that the overall concept is viable and the com-
munication between the components works as expected. Secondly, the previously identified attacks are systematically
applied to the testbed and evaluated for their feasibility and effects to the system. Finally, it is evaluated what open
research questions could be assessed with the help of the proposed testbed.
4.1 Evaluation of the Implementation
For some research questions and learning content, network traffic is a critical element. For example, intrusion detection
can be configured and evaluated based on the network traffic captures of executed attacks. Figure 9 shows the density
distribution of outgoing packets per second per component during a one minute capture while the testbed was running
its process.
It clearly shows that the amount of packets per second differs, depending on the device. The PLC (192.168.0.30),
which contains most of the logic and therefore is the most communicative component with about 110 packets per
second. This is because the PLC polls the remote IOs every 100 ms while simultaneously being polled by the SCADA
and HMI. In comparison, the communication of the HMI, which updates the values only once every 500 ms, amounts
to significantly less traffic. Either remote IOs takes about 55 packets per second to communicate, which is mostly due
to the constant polling of the PLC. The similar behaviour of the remote IOs leads to a correlative density representation.
Lastly, the SCADA system, which has no hard timing requirements, only amounts to about 20 packets per second.
4.2 Attack Validation within the Testbed
Table 2: Evaluation of a selection of possible devices in the testbed.
ICS
Level
Attack
description CIA STRIDE
Remote
attacker
Local
attacker Tools
Skill
level Impact
Detection
difficulty
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
process
level
Manipulate A TD 7 3 — low high easy
Physically Damage A TD 7 3 — low high easy
1
field
level
DoS Sensor A D 3 3 hping3 low high easy
Disconnect IO power/network A TD 7 3 — low high easy
Manipulate IO physical A TD 7 3 — low high easy
MitM spoof values IO-PLC CIA STRIDE 7 3 script high high medium
1
control
level
DoS PLC A D 3 3 hping3 low high easy
DoS HMI A D 3 3 hping low medium easy
Sniffing network C I 7 3 Tcpdump low low difficult
MitM spoof values HMI-PLC CIA STRIDE 7 3 script high high medium
Physical access HMI CIA STRIDE 7 3 — low low medium
2
process
control
level
DoS SCADA A D 3 3 hping3 high low easy
Sniffing network C I 7 3 Tcpdump low low difficult
MitM spoof values SCADA-PLC CIA STRIDE 7 3 script high high medium
Attack SCADA CIA STRIDE 3 3 script medium high medium
Table 2 shows an overview of selected attacks performed on the testbed. In order to correlate the attacks with the ICS
levels 1 , the first column enumerates the levels zero to two of the Industrial Automation Pyramid. The second
column Attack description 2 of the table contains a list of attacks derived from Section 2.5. These are the scenarios
for a potential attacker. The three basic protection goals of IT-Security are Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
Therefore, the third column, CIA 3 , maps each attack to the protection goals it compromises. The STRIDE 4 threat
model by Kohnfelder & Garg (1999) in the fourth column uses the indicators Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege as a more detailed threat mapping. Next, the
column five maps the attacker model 5 introduced in Section 2.4 to each attack, to clarify which attacks actually
need physical access and which do not. Column 6 contains Tools 6 which are used to evaluate and perform attacks on
9
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the testbed are. Where viable ready-made and open-source solutions are preferred. Additionally, customized scripts
are provided to execute attacks where no ready to use tools is available. Here is a brief overview over the tools and the
corresponding attacks:
• Network scanning is done with nmap by Lyon (2009). The specific Modbus/TCP Nmap Scripting Engine
(NSE) script5 is used to identify Modbus/TCP devices.
• For network sniffing the Linux tool tcpdump (Jacobson et al. (1989)) and wireshark (Combs et al. (2008))
is used. Wireshark, a software for traffic capture and protocol dissection for various protocols including
Modbus/TCP, allows for easy package analysis.
• For flooding and DoS attacks the tool hping3 (Sanfilippo (2005)) is used. It supports a multitude of protocols
and configurations to perform different forms of DoS attacks.
• For MitM attacks a custom python script for easy editing is used, based on the libraries pymodbus and
scapy (Biondi et al. (2011)).
• For active manipulation of values in the Modbus/TCP communication, a custom python script or interactive
python shell with pymodbus is employed.
The seventh column, Skill level 7 , refers to the knowledge required by the attacker to achieve his malicious goals.
Each attack scenario is rated from low, medium and high which primarily represents the amount of system specific
insight an attacker needs to follow through with his attack. Other aspects, such as the basic technical knowledge and
the expertise in available tools do not weigh in the rating quite as much since most tools and relevant documentation
are freely and sufficiently available. To measure the Impact 8 in column eight, again a rating from low, over medium
to high is used to reflect the consequences to the system and the physical process of each attack. The severity of the
rating depends on factors such as whether or not the plant can be damaged as a direct or indirect result of the attack,
e.g. when the punching machine does not stop at the limit switch and crashes into the ground. Finally, the Detection
difficulty 9 is assessed in column nine in the three levels low, medium high, as mentioned previously. It represents
a rough estimation of the likelihood of successful detection of an attack by defensive mechanisms, e.g. an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS). The skill level, impact and detection difficulty are rated in three levels. Attacks in real
scenarios depend on many circumstances and can vary heavily when compared with each other. This is why the table
can only give a tendency, which should be taken with a grain of salt.
With this evaluation, we have shown that even low-cost testbeds offer many possibilities of attacks. It is important to
see direct effects for new researchers and students, such as the physical process. This shows ICS specifics, as digital
devices interacts with the real world and attacks on network devices can have an impact on a process.
4.3 Discussion of Extensions and Research Questions
This section elaborates on how LICSTER’s functionality can be enhanced by extensions and what research questions
could be assessed on the foundation of our testbed. Also the research ideas introduced by Ca´rdenas et al. (2008) are
picked up in this paper as well. This demonstrates how adaptive LICSTER really is and how much room for research
and discussion it provides, despite its simplicity. In fact, it is this very simplicity that makes this testbed so easy to use
and promising for students and beginners.
4.3.1 Extensions
LICSTER can easily be extended, for example by virtual ICS components (Antonioli & Tippenhauer (2015)) or stan-
dard office clients in virtual machines. The extensibility of our testbed allows for the simulation of potentially huge
environments, always with the physical process integrated. Apart from enhancing LICSTER by further components
and clients, its communication capabilities can be extended by additional protocols such as, for example, OPC UA.
That way LICSTER can be used as platform to evaluate the security aspects of upcoming ICS protocols (Renjie et al.
(2010)). Evaluations like these could lead to the establishment of requirements for secure protocols in ICSs. One topic
that is being discussed, e.g. by Givehchi et al. (2014) is to operate parts of an ICS, like PLCs, in the cloud or fog. It
is interesting to examine further security research in addition to the evaluation of availability and control timings. All
what is necessary is to move the OpenPLC, which runs on any Linux-based computer, into the cloud or fog.
4.3.2 Offense Scenarios
Morris & Gao (2013) presented 17 attacks against ICSs which use the same Modbus/TCP protocol as LICSTER.
Hence, these attacks can be executed on our testbed and evaluated with the real world impacts on the physical process.
5https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/modbus-discover.html
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One of the most serious dangers to critical infrastructures is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), as explained, among
others, by Gouglidis et al. (2018). LICSTER provides an elementary but sufficient platform to further investigate these
types of attacks, since it provides all of the relevant components of an ICS including the physical process.
4.3.3 Defense Mechanisms
A protection mechanism often used for ICSs is network monitoring (Zhu & Sastry (2010)). Due to the fact that
LICSTER spans over multiple ICS layers, it incorporates various types of network communication, as can be seen in
Section 4.1. For example, the communication between the PLC and the remote IOs shows clear timing criticality while
the traffic between the SCADA system and the PLC does not. With these distinctive communication characteristics,
LICSTER can be used to evaluate IDS implementations and to test their detection mechanisms. Also the remote IO,
can be programmed with custom firmware, which is mostly not possible when proprietary hardware is used. With this,
intelligent Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) edge nodes, e.g. for intrusion detection, can be placed into the testbed.
This small selection of selected topics shows that it is often not the size that counts, but it is more important to map an
entire industrial process within a testbed. This allows a simple demonstration of impacts in the physical world caused
by cyber attacks. Particularly for learning purposes, it is important to have simple tools to assess complex topics.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented LICSTER, an open-source, low-cost ICS testbed for education and research. We have
shown, that the concept can be and set-up for about 500 Euro, This way we lower the entry barrier so that more people
can get hands-on experience with ICSs. To enhance the learning experience of how the physical world interacts with
the digital environment, we introduced suitable attacker models and possible attacks. With these measures we intent
to provide easy access to more students and researchers to the topic of ICS security.
Furthermore, even with a testbed as elementary as LICSTER, current and relevant research questions can be assessed,
due to the open-source nature of the project and its components. With LICSTER offensive as well as defensive
techniques can be tested and evaluated on different ICS levels. The physical process is a key segment of LICSTER,
which allows for a haptic understanding of the effects of cyber attacks on ICSs.
Availability
We provide supplementary material at https://github.com/hsainnos. The material includes all required source
code, how-tos, binaries, scripts and network captures to understand and reproduce the results.
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